INTRODUCTION
This most recent addition to Carlos Vazquez's impressive body of Eleventh Amendment scholarship is; like 'his earlier work, both learned and provocative. As the doctrine in this field evolves, devolves, or selfdestructs so rapidly, depending on one's perspective, it is tremendously helpful to be privy to the running commentary of such a keen and watchful scholar.
In this paper, Vazquez asks: assuming the correctness of the Supreme Court's current sovereign immunity doctrine, should treaties be treated differently, from federal statutes when determining whether they abrogate state sovereign immunity? This is a question that federal courts scholars might consider rather narrow-a point I will return to later.' It appears that the resonance of this question for those steeped in international law, at first blush at least, is greater.
As law professors we are used to having questions posed to us with certain assumptions appended, certain questions taken off the table. The particular assumption from which Vazquez wishes to begin-that current sovereign immunity doctrine is correct-I find a particularly bitter pill to swallow, yet it would seem that accepting the assumption is a useful way to focus on the question of treaties versus statutes. I will begin by doing so, but later on I will suggest that the notion of a fixed "sovereign immunity doctrine" is descriptively problematic. I will, also suggest, and here I think Vazquez and I are in agreement, that the narrow question about treaties cannot be usefully considered without turning to the broader questions of the scope and correctness of current sovereign immunity doctrine. Thus I will begin by considering the question as posed: assuming the validity of current doctrine, should treaties be treated like federal statutes when deciding whether they abrogate sovereign immunity? I will then turn to the problems inherent in the question posed.
I. THE POWER OF TREATIES TO ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER CURRENT DOCTRINE
Vazquez posits that, in light of current doctrine, the best argument for according treaties broader power to abrogate sovereign immunity is what he calls a "foreign affairs exceptionalism" argument, based on Missouri v. Holland. 2 He concludes that foreign affairs exceptionalism is not justified in this case; that the Constitution treats statutes and treaties the same with respect to remedies, and therefore that both sources of power should be subject to the same constitutional limits on their ability to abrogate. 3 I will argue that one need not reach the question of foreign affairs exceptionalism at all in order to justify separate treatment of treaties.
Vazquez convincingly argues that the Holland case should be understood as holding that the limits on congressional power found in Article I section 8 are not applicable to Congress's treaty power, which arises from a wholly separate source. He goes on to say, however, that "[i]t does not follow that general limitations found elsewhere in the Constitution do not apply to the Treaty Power." 4 He concludes that although the Founders were centrally concerned with enforcing state compliance with treaties, the mechanisms they chose for doing so were identical to those they chose for enforcing federal statutes: the Supremacy Clause and Article III, neither of which distinguishes statutes from treaties. 5 Therefore, he argues, constitutional limitations on the federal statutory power to abrogate must apply equally to the treaty power.
But one does not have to join the fray about the proper interpretation of Missouri v. Holland (and indeed one can wholly agree with Vazquez's interpretation of Holland) to claim that this argument misapprehends current sovereign immunity doctrine. The notion of a generally applicable sovereign immunity doctrine is at odds with the current doctrinal understanding, which is highly clause-bound. 6 In determining the scope of the abrogation power, it is essential to identify the authority under which Congress acted in order to know whether its attempt to subject the states to damage remedies is constitutional. 7 That is, Vazquez's insight about the meaning of Holland-that it simply held that each source of Congressional power must be evaluated on its own ters--is equally applicable to interpreting the scope of Congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity. Whereas major federal statutes were once allowed the luxury of ambiguity about their precise source of federal authority, the Seminole Tribe decision 9 has made identification of the source of Congressional power to abrogate crucial. Seminole Tribe disallowed abrogation under the Commerce Power, and reaffirmed Congress's power to abrogate under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" In short, it is no longer possible to discuss the contours of a broad abrogation power without reference to the source of the power to abrogate.
Vazquez approaches the clause-bound nature of abrogation as if it is inapplicable to the treaty question because he characterizes current doctrine as accepting the chronology argument. That is, he interprets Seminole Tribe and its progeny to hold that only the Fourteenth Amendment, or at least only constitutional provisions passed subsequent to the Eleventh Amendment, may abrogate sovereign immunity, and concludes that since the treaty power falls on the wrong side of the divide, it cannot be used to abrogate." This is a defensible cannot be read to justify limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution."' 2 But the fact that the Fitzpatrick decision, which after all considered only the propriety of a Fourteenth Amendment claim, cannot be relied on to justify an appeal to antecedent provisions does not mean that the appeal cannot be justified.
Seminole Tribe can also be read to declare that Article I is no longer a legitimate source of Congressional power for abrogating sovereign immunity. It contains language that "Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."' 3 As Professor Fletcher recently observed, however, this language probably should not be taken literally, 4 given the possibility of overriding sovereign immunity (albeit under a "waiver" rather than an "abrogation" rationale) under the Spending Clause."
Seminole Tribe holds that the states shall be immune from unconsenting suit, "save where there has been a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention." 6 Thus, the parceling out of power at the time of the framing of the Constitution remains an important inquiry. Alden v. Maine [Vol. 42:743 from the structure of the original Constitution itself."' 7 The Court went on to explain that " [t] he Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather than established sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle; it follows that the scope of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design." 8 Nor, the Court in Alden made clear, is the principle directly related to the scope of Article III power; it is a separate and distinct structural principle inherent in our Constitutional system of federalism. 9 In short, current abrogation doctrine seems to demand an inquiry into the structural principles inherent in our Constitutional system of federalism, and into exactly what notion of state sovereignty was agreed upon in the plan of the convention. Given the Court's repeated incantation of the "plan of the convention" and "inherent structural principles," it is unfortunate that it has provided little guidance about how these should be identified, apart from assuring us that they should not be defined to include suit against unconsenting states. Nevertheless, this is the task at hand. Let me emphasize that I am striving at this point merely to describe current doctrine. Many fine scathing critiques of the Court's reasoning have been written, pointing out its manifold flaws. 2 " My point here is simply that even accepting the Court's doctrinal scheme, even accepting that it is coherent to speak of pre-existing states entering the Union with and retaining a sweeping sovereignty, 2 ' even accepting that this preexisting sovereignty is somehow immune from the great shifts of power after the Civil War, 22 it is still necessary to determine the current scope of state sovereignty by examining the "structural principles inherent in our system of federalism." 23 Should the treaty power be equated with the Commerce Power as identically placed in the structure of the Constitution? Returning to my 17. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999 original point, one need not argue for treaty power exceptionalism in order to maintain that the Treaty Power differs from the Commerce Power in significant ways, and that each should be considered separately. Indeed, I fear that the notion of treaty power exceptionalism may become a distracting semantic red flag, disguising that much narrower proposition. My aim here is not to prevail in the argument that the Treaty Power should be treated differently from the Commerce Power, but more narrowly to argue that Vazquez is incorrect to equate them simply because both appear in the unamended Constitution, and are treated equally by the Supremacy Clause. Treaties are different from federal statutes in obvious ways. Most important for our purposes, they are, not an exercise of Congress's Article I power to legislate in enumerated areas, but of the President's Article II power, with the advice of the Senate." Alexander Hamilton called them a unique species of power that is neither legislative nor executive in nature." As my colleague Brian Havel notes, "the international treaty... represents a conscious departure from the domestic route to legislation." 2 6 Treaties contain, as Vazquez notes, structural safeguards that do not exist with respect to statutes. 2 7 Thus at the very least we can say that in the plan of the convention, treaties were not viewed as simply another species of legislation, and were assigned a separate and even unique role in the constitutional structure. The extent to which this separate role dictates separate abrogation rules is the question that should be debated. There is ample evidence that the states' refusal to enforce treaties was "not only important in shaping constitutional reform [after the Articles of Confederation] but of overwhelming significance." 28 There is evidence that, whether or not the federal government was to have exclusive power over foreign affairs, 9 24. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV, 389, 458 (1998) Although I have attempted to discuss the narrow question raised in light of current doctrine, there are serious problems with that endeavor. Vazquez's discussion illustrates the difficulties of even provisionally assuming the correctness, or perhaps the very existence, of a stable, discernible body of current sovereign immunity doctrine-when in fact many of those boundaries are shifting and contested. As Vazquez himself has been instrumental in explaining, current Eleventh Amendment doctrine is deeply schizophrenic. 32 In an article explaining this schizophrenia, he described "two distinct and conflicting analytical strains," 33 a "supremacy" strain that stresses the practical insignificance of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and a "state sovereignty" strain that views the Eleventh Amendment as standing for a vital and important principle that must be safeguarded, even at the cost of remedying governmental wrongs. 34 Vazquez rests much of his argument for treating statutes like treaties on their equal treatment in the Supremacy Clause, and on the primacy of that clause as a means of ensuring an acceptable level of state there is no guarantee of federal uniformity in treaty interpretation). 
A. The Supremacy Strain
The supremacy strain assumes a utilitarian calibration of remedies, some sort of conscious effort to ensure that state autonomy is not achieved at the expense of too little remediation. 36 According to this theory, the existence and efficacy of remedies is an essential' part of the scope of the doctrine itself. That is, the doctrine will operate to ensure "necessary judicial means to assure compliance" with federal obligation." 45 or at least language in those decisions, bode ill for continued broad reliance on its use. As these cases make clear, the Ex parte Young doctrine, like the abrogation doctrine, is applied in an increasingly clause-bound manner. That is, whether it safeguards the supremacy of federal law will depend on the source of the law. 46 It may be evolving into a narrower utilitarian rule solely 40. Vazquez notes that violations of treaties adversely affect a nation's reputation for keeping its promises, and may also subject the nation as a whole to retaliation. Vazquez, supra note 3, at 729. As Robert Wright recently argued, not only the balance of states versus federal sovereignty, but the scope of national sovereignty itself, must be debated anew in light of the importance of international treaties to the effort to address modern global threats to our security as a nation. See (1984) (noting Pennhurst Court's frank acknowledgement of Ex parte Young doctrine's practical purpose designed to safeguard the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 or to be used only when "necessary. 48 It may be evolving from a utilitarian rule meant to safeguard supremacy into a rule that operates only when the suit is not "really" against the state. 9 Thus we cannot assume that it will be held to safeguard supremacy equally for treaties and statutes, or even for all federal statutes, or even that it will be applied uniformly under any particular federal statute.
The supremacy strain, with its focus on actual remediation, also demands an inquiry into how the balance of federal supremacy and state autonomy works in practice under a particular remedial regime. 0 Here is another context in which treaties and statutes should not be automatically equated. The question should be: has state autonomy been inadequately protected against incursions by treaties or statutes? As to treaties, Vazquez notes the threat to federalism posed by, for example, broad and vaguely worded treaties protecting human rights." Yet the current evidence points away from such a threat. As Jack Goldsmith observes, the political branches often choose to protect state interests over foreign relations when the two appear to clash. 2 He notes that "even when the political branches enact preemptive federal foreign relations law, they often do so in a manner that reflects the interests of the states and minimizes intrusions on their prerogatives."" Louis Henkin similarly observes that the Senate substantially represents the states against internationalist federal regulation, and has often protected their interests and adopted their views, 4 as it did, for example, in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act," which, as Henkin summarizes, of enforcing supremacy of federal law). Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 , 1675 (1997 [ Vol. 42:743 provides: that the agreement shall not itself violate state law, but requires an act of Congress to achieve that end. The Act also provides that the courts may invalidate state law on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Agreement only in an action brought by the federal government for that purpose. Congress also provided a role for the states in the dispute settlement process. 5 6
See
I recognize that as a theoretical matter the "political safeguards" argument is controversial, 57 but my point here is that in evaluating sovereign immunity doctrine within a utilitarian framework like the "supremacy strain," one must assess how, in fact, those safeguards have been working.
An additional practical question arises in this assessment process. As
Vazquez observes, "few treaties address domestic remedies... and even fewer are so specific as to require remedies against the state itself as opposed to officials." 58 It appears that, as to treaties, the question of abrogation simply does not come up very often. The problem is far more immediate in regard to federal statutes. Within just the last five years, the Court has precluded Congress from abrogating sovereign immunity, despite its clear intent to do so, under the Indian Gaming Labor Standards Act, 62 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 63 and the Americans With Disabilities Act. 6 ' I will not here catalogue the wide ranging and impressive body of scholarship expressing not just criticism of but alarm at the Court's increasing willingness to use sovereign immunity doctrine to override federal law. 65 The immediate point I underline here is that if we are to ask how current sovereign immunity doctrine is working in practice, the answer is not the same for treaties and statutes. The concerns about treaties seem at this point largely theoretical. 6 ' The-concern about statutes is immediate and serious. Many scholars, and I count myself among them, believe that the supremacy of federal statutory law is severely threatened under the current doctrinal regime. As I observed elsewhere:
[The Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence] relies on an expansive version of sovereign immunity whose claimed immanence is such that it supersedes the limitations imposed by the language of the Constitution, and trumps, without any justification beyond its existence, weighty countervailing principles like governmental accountability and the supremacy of federal law. The Court has done much to 'denationalize' [citation omitted] systematic federal protection of core federal rights, and has done so without acknowledging that the importance of according federal protection to such rights ought to be part of the equation. 67 The larger point, however, is one with which I believe Vazquez would agree. Treaty exceptionalism, or indeed any separate treatment of treaties, will not address the real question of inadequate remediation for violations of statutory law. 68 If the Court is serious about ensuring adequate remediation, it must rethink a calibration effort that has gone seriously awry.
B. The State Sovereignty Strain
There is an even more serious problem with assuming a stable doctrinal framework for this discussion of treaties and statutes-specifically, the very schizophrenia Vazquez identifies. What version of sovereign immunity doctrine are we talking about, exactly? Though Vazquez expresses concern about the Court's increased allegiance to the state sovereignty strain, 69 he is nevertheless too optimistic about the continued existence of the supremacy strain. Alden is simply the most recent and most emphatic statement of the Court's deeply held belief that sovereign immunity is a deep, structural, first order principle that must be protected irrespective of whether it leaves an injured party remediless. 7 " This belief permeates the Court's increasingly aggressive applications of sovereign immunity doctrine to bar Congressional abrogation, and is becoming more and more visible in its steady contraction of the doctrine of Ex parte Young. 7 
"
If indeed sovereign immunity law now rests, or increasingly rests, on this uncompromising principle, what lessons should we draw for the question Vazquez posed: whether treaties have more power than statutes to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment? As he recognizes, if I may put the matter colloquially, at that point the difference between treaties and statutes becomes the least of our problems. A doctrine that does violence to our ability to enforce the rule of law or guarantee the supremacy of federal law against state government is itself a threat to our sovereignty as a nation-albeit a threat with domestic origins. As 68. See generally Vazquez, supra note 3.
69.
Id. at 25 ("Of greater concern is language in some recent decisions suggesting that the Kenneth Randall observed, ours is not only a constitutional system, but a democratic one, in which "individuals retain the rights the government should secure, even against their representatives in government. '72 On this broad question, at least, Vazquez and I appear to agree. If this is an accurate description of our current situation, it cannot be solved through half-measures. Current sovereign immunity doctrine itself must be rethought in light of the principles undergirding our aspirations for a "more perfect union." 73 72. Randall, supra note 30, at 2100. 73. See Louis Henkin, Silbey Lecture, Human Rights and State 'Sovereignty,' March 1994, reprinted in adapted form at 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31 (1995-96) ("in the United States, We the People asserted sovereignty not to maintain their natural liberty ('sovereignty') so as to be free from government, but to form and consent to a "more perfect union.").
